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Abstract
Consider a sequential process where agents have individual values at every possible
step. A planner is in charge of selecting steps and distributing the accumulated aggre-
gate values among agents. We model this process by a directed network where each
edge is associated with a vector of individual values. This model applies to several new
and existing problems, e.g., developing a connected public facility and distributing to-
tal values received by surrounding districts; selecting a long-term production plan and
sharing final profits among partners of a firm; choosing a machine schedule to serve
different tasks and distributing total outputs among task owners.
Herein, we provide the first axiomatic study on path selection and value sharing in
networks. We consider four sets of axioms from different perspectives, including those
related to (1) the sequential consistency of assignments with respect to network decom-
positions; (2) the monotonicity of assignments with respect to network expansion; (3)
the independence of assignments with respect to certain network transformations; and
(4) implementation in the case where the planner has no information about the under-
lying network and individual values. Surprisingly, these four disparate sets of axioms
characterize similar classes of solutions — selecting efficient path(s) and assigning to
each agent a share of total values which is independent of their individual values. Fur-
thermore, we characterize more general solutions that depend on individual values.
Keywords: Sequential Values, Sharing, Network, Redistribution
JEL classification: C72, D44, D71, D82.
1 Introduction
The axiomatic division of costs and benefits has been extensively studied over the past 60
years, starting with bargaining (Nash [53]) and cooperative games (Shapley [56]), and fol-
lowed by applications to problems such as rationing and bankruptcy (O’Neill [55], Aumann
and Maschler [3], Thomson [60], Moulin [48, 49]), airport cost-sharing (Littlechild and
Owen [41], Thomson [62]), hierarchical ventures (Hougaard et al. [26]), and more general
cost-sharing problems (e.g., Sprumont [57, 58], Moulin [47], Friedman and Moulin [22],
Moulin and Sprumont [51], Moulin and Shenker [50]). Such studies have characterized a
wide variety of sharing rules using axioms motivated by positive and normative perspec-
tives. However, they are largely limited to scenarios with a fixed resource. Little is known
regarding scenarios that are more general in two respects: (1) the amount of the resource
may not be fixed but can be chosen, and (2) the resource may be generated in a sequence of
steps, where the amount in future steps depends on the choices made in previous steps. Such
a generalized problem requires resource-generating steps to be determined together with the
allocation. This “two-tiered” approach not only expands the range of problems, but also
gives rise to a new question on the interdependence of the step selection rule and sharing
rule.
To better illustrate our problem, consider a planner in charge of developing a connected
public facility (e.g., highways, rail-roads, or irrigation canals). The project might be de-
veloped in different steps, each of which might produce different benefits to the agents in a
given society. The planner is in charge of choosing the steps and redistributing the benefits
of the project among the agents. After proceeding along each step, the planner faces a new
problem. This new problem is different from the original one and might depend on the steps
preceded (Section 1.1 discusses other applications).
Formally, we model a sequential process as an acyclic-directed-network with a common
source and multiple sinks (hereafter referred to as a network), where each edge represents a
possible step in the process and each node faces a forward process. There is a finite number
of agents. A problem consists of a network where each edge is attached with a vector of
individual values of agents. The value of a path connecting the source and a sink is the sum
of all individual values over all edges in the path. A solution selects in each problem one or
several paths with the same value, and distributes among the agents the value of the selected
path(s).
We provide the first systematic and comprehensive study of this problem by considering
axioms appropriate to a wide range of scenarios. Surprisingly, our four sets of axioms from
different perspectives characterize similar classes of solutions — selecting the path(s) with
the highest value (hereafter referred to as the efficient path(s)) and assigning to each agent
a share of the value of the path(s) which is independent of individual values. Moreover, we
show the richness of suitable solutions in different scenarios. For instance, we characterize
a large class of solutions that depend on individual values in a “rationalizable” way. For an
overview of our results, see Section 1.2.
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1.1 Applications and Solutions
To see the applicability of our model and rules, consider the following examples:
Sharing the benefits of connected public facilities. For the construction of highways, rail-
roads or irrigation canals, a government usually selects one of several potential routes. Bene-
fits of each edge to agents in surrounding districts depend on the convenience of the access to
it. Typically, the government selects the efficient path, and performs no transfer so that each
agent receives his individual benefits. This efficient-path-selection and no-transfer solution
is denoted by EFF-NT.1 However, the districts located closer to the selected route could
benefit substantially more than those farther away, and this could lead to social conflicts. For
instance, tens of thousands of people in Linshui county (in China) protested against the gov-
ernment for abandoning the plan of a high speed railway route passing the county in 2015
(see Figure 1). Another solution could have been for the government to select the efficient
path and assign to each agent an equal share of the total benefits (denoted by EFF-ES). Such
redistribution can be achieved via a lump-sum tax and subsidy on the agents.
Dazhou
Dazhu Linshui
Chongqing
Dianjiang Changshou
Quxian Guangan
Figure 1: Network outlining the three potential routes to build a high-speed railway connect-
ing Dazhou and Chongqing. People from Linshui protested in 2015 when the government
shortlisted the upper and lower routes.
Profit sharing in companies and joint-business ventures. A company chooses a priority
over different projects and makes a redistribution of profits among the agents (i.e., employ-
ees). Agents generate different profits on different projects. The choice of earlier projects
changes the availability and profitability of later projects. Choosing a priority of the projects
that maximizes the total profit (efficient-path-selection) is natural for a for-profit company.
Agents are often rewarded with bonuses that are tied to the profits they have generated.2
1When there are multiple efficient paths, a tie-breaking rule is needed. For example, ties are broken in favor
of agents with a lexicographic order.
2For partnerships between professionals, such as a group of lawyers in a law firm, the redistribution among
partners is typically 100% of the total profit (Juarez and Nitta [37]). Our problem can also be applied to the
case of other for-profit companies, where the employees are rewarded with a fixed percentage of the total profit,
such as Chobani which has committed to redistribute 10% of the profit to its employees.
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EFF-NT is a typical solution that rewards agents for the profit they have contributed. Alter-
natively, EFF-ES rewards each agent an equal share of the total profit. 3
1.2 Overview of the Results
We study two versions of the problem in relation to the information of a planner. For the first
part of the paper, the planner has complete information about the network and individual
values of the agents. The planner is interested in systematically selecting a path(s) and share
the value of the selected path(s). We provide three axiomatic characterizations in this case.
Our first characterization relates to the independence of the timing of redistribution.
Loosely speaking, given any node of a selected path, agents could be paid first based on
the “subproblem” from the source to the node and then based on the other subproblem from
the node to the original sinks. We require that the two allocations from the two subprob-
lems add up to the allocation chosen for the original problem. Hence, agents are indifferent
between receiving a lump-sum payment at the end of the process or receiving installments
step by step (sequential composition). This rules out renegotiations of agents at interme-
diate stages.4 Besides, we impose two basic axioms. First, in each problem with a path
of positive value, at least one agent should receive a positive assignment (non-triviality).
Second, a small change in the individual values should have a small impact on the alloca-
tion (continuity). These three axioms characterize the class of solutions that selects efficient
path(s) and assigns to each agent a proportion of the value of the selected path(s) where the
proportion is constant over all problems. For example, in a two-agent case, for each problem,
10% is always assigned to agent 1, and 90% to agent 2.
Our second characterization imposes a monotonicity axiom. It requires that no agent
shall get hurt from the technology improvement which brings a new edge and destination to
the existing network (technology monotonicity). This single axiom characterizes the class
of solutions that select efficient path(s) and assigns to each agent a proportion of the value
of the selected path(s) where the proportion depends only on this value. For example, in a
two-agent case, for each problem, equal sharing between agents 1 and 2 whenever the total
value is no less than 100, and for any incremental value above 100, 10% is assigned to agent
1 and 90% to agent 2.
Our third characterization relates to several independence principles with respect to cer-
tain network transformations. First, suppose that a step in a process consists of two substeps.
Then whether the step is represented by one edge or two consecutive edges should have no
impact on the allocation, as long as the value vectors of the two edges add up to that of the
single edge (split invariance). Second, consider a problem with two subnetworks intersect-
ing only at the source. Each path in one subnetwork is step-wise Pareto dominated by some
other path in the other subnetwork. Then removing this subnetwork from the network should
3Equal sharing is often used in professional partnership (Encinosa et al. [20], and Farrell and Sctochmer
[21]). See Bartling and von Siemens [5], Bose et al. [11], and Kobayashi et al. [40] for justifications under
various situations.
4For generic problems where no two paths have the same value, this axiom implies a “dynamic consistency”
studied in other settings, where once a path selection is made, it does not change at intermediate steps.
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not affect the allocation (irrelevance of dominated paths). Third, suppose that after solv-
ing a problem, an undiscovered disjoint subnetwork connecting to the source is found to be
available. To deal with this issue, one procedure is to cancel the initial allocation and select
an allocation from the complete problem that augments the original network with the new
subnetwork. An alternative procedure is to select an allocation from the simplified problem
that augments an edge associated with the initial allocation with the new subnetwork. We
require that the two procedures lead to the same allocation to avoid the dispute of agents
(parallel composition). The three axioms, together with continuity, characterize a general
class of “rationalizable” solution. A planner who adopts such a solution selects an efficient
path(s) and divides the value in two steps. In each problem, the planner first redistributes
the value of each path based on individual values at the path. This gives a set of potential
redistributions. Second, the planner selects an optimal allocation based on the set of po-
tential redistributions according to a partial order. To understand the partial order, imagine
that the planner have some selection criteria such as Pareto dominance and “fairness”. If
there is one potential redistribution that dominates every other potential redistribution in the
set by some criterion, then the planner selects this potential redistribution (the maximum
redistribution). Otherwise, the planner selects one outside allocation that dominates each
potential redistribution in the set and has the minimum “departure” from the set (the least
upper bound). Thus, the sharing rule is rationalizable by this partial order. This order is
incomplete since some redistributions may not be comparable by either criterion. When the
partial order is complete, the sharing depends only on the value of the selected path(s). This
subclass of rules is characterized by an additional axiom. Loosely speaking, it requires that
in each problem with a generic “parallel network”, the allocation depends only on the se-
lected path (irrelevance of parallel outside options). The solutions obtained in the first two
characterizations are special cases of this subclass.
Although the classes of solutions above are characterized from three different perspec-
tives, they all reduce to EFF-ES if we further impose a basic fair requirement.5 That is,
agents having the same individual values should receive the same shares (equal treatment
of equals).
For the second part of the paper, the planner has no information about the network or
individual values of the agents, whereas the agents have full information. After a path is
selected, the planner only observes the individual values of the agents in each step along the
path. A sharing rule in this case may only depend on what the planner observes. We assume
that the planner is interested in the implementation of an efficient path by choosing a sharing
rule. We characterize a class of sharing rules that incentivize the agents to collectively select
an efficient path.
Our first axiom requires that, for any two paths, the sharing rule assign weakly larger
shares to at least k agents at the path with a larger value (k-majority), where k is larger than
half the number of agents. This is a stability notion since it guarantees an efficient path to
be a Condorcet winner when agents vote for paths. Moreover, when agents sequentially vote
5In the third characterization, the subclass of rationalizable solutions satisfying irrelevance of parallel out-
side options, rather than the general class, reduces to EFF-ES.
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at each node for edges to continue, it guarantees an efficient path to be chosen as a subgame
perfect equilibrium under the k-majority rule. Second, we require that the identity of agents
should not matter (anonymity). These two axioms imply that a sharing rule assigns the av-
erage value of a path to at least k agents. Furthermore, the equal sharing rule is characterized
by adding one of several axioms ranging from sequential composition to other monotonicity
axioms.
1.3 Literature review
While the axiomatic study of sharing rules has been widely discussed and applied in many
settings, our general two-tiered framework that selects the path along with the sharing rule
has not received much attention in the literature. Our model provides an abstract framework
for more stylistic two-step problems such as the queuing problem (Chun [15]), the minimal
cost spanning tree (Kar [39], Dutta and Kar [18], Bergantin˜os and Vidal-Puga [7], Hougaard
et al. [27], Claus and Kleitman [16]) and other cost-sharing models (Juarez [34], Juarez
[35], Juarez and Kumar [36]). In such problems, an ordering of agents (queuing), a network
meeting certain conditions (spanning tree) or other decisions (selection of a group or a path)
must be made and its benefit/cost divided among agents. In contrast with this literature,
we do not assume that the most efficient path (subnetwork, subgraph, ordering or group of
agents) is selected, but instead its selection is axiomatized along with a sharing rule.
The division of benefits/cost under exogenous network structures has been recently stud-
ied. For instance, allocations in linear river problems are studied by Ambec and Sprumont
[2], Ni and Wang [54], and Ambec and Ehlers [1]. More complex river network problems are
studied by Brink et al. [10], and Dong et al. [17]. The allocation of benefits in hierarchical
ventures is studied by Hougaard et al. [26]. Values of cooperative game under permissible
structures are studied by Brink [8], Brink et al. [9] and Gilles et al. [24]. Unlike our paper,
this literature does not study the selection of the path, but instead assume that it is given.
The second part of the paper relates to the recent literature on the implementation of the
efficient subgraphs in networks. For instance, Juarez and Kumar [36] implement the efficient
subgraph in connection networks, Hougaard and Tvede [28, 29] implement the minimal cost
spanning tree, and Juarez and Nitta [37] implement the efficient time allocation in production
economies. Similar to our paper, the main objective of this literature is to select an “efficient
path”. The main difference is that we adopt an axiomatic approach that works for a variety
of games, including sequential voting for a path.
Our model is the first to jointly address the issue of selecting paths and sharing the total
value axiomatically for sequential problems where the information of the individual values
of agents is available at every step.
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2 The model under complete information
Fix a finite group of agents N = {1, ..., n}. We refer to a finite directed multigraph6 with a
unique source (possibly multiple sinks) and no cycles as a network. A network represents a
sequential process in which each edge represents a feasible step to continue and each node
faces a number of steps to choose from.7 Let G be the set of networks. For each G ∈ G, a
value function v associated with G is a function that assigns to each edge e in G a vector
v(e) ∈ Rn+ where for each i ∈ N, the i-th coordinate vi(e) represents the value of agent i
generated in step e.8 LetVG be the set of all value functions associated with G. A problem
is a pair (G, v) where G ∈ G and v ∈ VG. For each x ∈ Rn+, we simply use (e, x) to denote
a problem where the network contains a single edge e and it is assigned the vector x of
individual values. Let P be the set of all problems.
For each problem (G, v) ∈ P, and for each edge e and each path L in G,9 let vN(e) :=∑
i∈N
vi(e) be the value of e, vN(L) :=
∑
e∈L
vN(e) the value of L, vN(G) := max
L∈G
vN(L) the value
of G, and L is called efficient if vN(L) = vN(G).
A solution is a pair (ϕ, µ) of functions on P such that for each (G, v) ∈ P, ϕ(G, v) is a
nonempty subset of paths in G with the same value, and µ(G, v) is an element of Rn+ such that
for each L ∈ ϕ(G, v), ∑
i∈N
µi(G, v) = vN(L).10
Example 1 (Path selection rules and sharing rules). First, we discuss two general methods
for path selection. Let u : Rn+ → R be a utility function over all vectors of individual values
(associated with edges).
i. [Additively separable rules] Consider a planner with a preference over paths that is
additively separable across edges. The planner selects a path(s) that maximizes the
sum of utilities of its edges. That is, for each (G, v) ∈ P, an additively separable rule
selects a subset of arg max
L in G
∑
e in L
u(v(e)).11 In particular, if for each x ∈ Rn+, u(x) =
∑
i∈N
xi,
it selects only efficient path(s). We denote by EFF a rule that selects efficient path(s).
ii. [Myopic rules] Consider a planner myopically selects a path by maximizing the util-
ities of immediate steps (edges). Only when more than one immediate steps give the
same utilities, the planner compares the utilities of additional steps. Formally, for each
(G, v) ∈ P, for each pair of paths L and L′, with consecutive edges e1, . . . , ek in L and
e¯1, . . . , e¯k
′
in L′ respectively, define L LEX L′ if for z, z′ ∈ Rmax{k,k′}+ such that
6A multigraph is a graph where there can be multiple edges with the same end nodes.
7Throughout the paper, we assume that the labels of nodes and edges in each network do not have identity.
8For simplicity, we restrict to non-negative values to keep the interpretation of benefits throughout the rest
of the paper. This assumption is without loss of generality, as all axioms and results in the paper can be adapted
trivially to values in R.
9In this paper, for each problem we only consider the paths from the source to a sink.
10We interpret µi(G, v) as the share of agent i. We assume that agents only care about their respective share.
Note that such shares depend on the graph, the value function and the path(s) selected ϕ(G, v). Furthermore, in
case several paths are selected, the allocation does not depend on the which path is actually realized.
11In both (i) and (ii), tie-breaking rules are needed when there are multiple maximum paths with different
values.
6
zi =
{
u(v(ei)) if i ∈ {1, . . . , k},
0 if i ∈ {k + 1, . . . ,max{k, k′}},
and
z′i =
{
u(v(e¯i)) if i ∈ {1, . . . , k′},
0 if i ∈ {k′ + 1, . . . ,max{k, k′}},
z lexicographically dominates z′. A myopic rule selects the maximum path(s) with
respect to LEX in each problem. We denote by MYO a myopic rule when for each
x ∈ Rn+, u(x) =
∑
i∈N
xi.
Next, we discuss two traditional sharing rules for a given path selection rule ϕ.
iii. [Equal-sharing] The equal sharing rule, denoted by ES, divides the value of the se-
lected paths equally. That is, for each (G, v) ∈ P, ES assigns each agent vN (L)n where
L ∈ ϕ(G, v).
iv. [No transfer] The no transfer sharing rule, denoted by NT, assigns agents their average
individual values over all selected paths.12 That is, for each (G, v) ∈ P, NT selects the
allocation 1|ϕ(G,v)|
∑
L∈ϕ(G,v)
∑
e in L
v(e). Note that when there is a unique path selected, NT
simply assigns to each agent his individual value.
Each combination of a path selection rule and a sharing rule is a solution. We use EFF-
ES to denote a solution that combines an EFF path selection rule and the ES sharing rule,
and use EFF-NT, MYO-ES, and MYO-NT to denote analogous solutions.
2.1 Sequential Composition
Consider the following axioms on a solution (ϕ, µ). We start with two basic axioms. The first
one says that each problem with a path that has a positive value should positively benefit at
least one agent. This is a basic efficiency property ruling out that all agents get nothing when
it is possible to distribute something.
Non-triviality: Given (G, v) ∈ P, if vN(G) > 0, then µi(G, v) > 0 for some i ∈ N.
Non-triviality is equivalent to not selecting paths with zero value when there is a path
with a positive value. This axiom is satisfied by EFF-ES, EFF-NT, MYO-ES, and MYO-NT.
Furthermore, it is satisfied by a solution with an additively separable path selection rule or a
myopic path selection rule, as defined in Example 1, as long as the utility function u is such
that for each x  0, u(x) > u(0).
12Alternatively, we can interpret this rule as selecting a path with equal probability, and assigning agents
their individual values at a path each time the path is selected.
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The second basic axiom says that in each network, small changes in individual values
should have small impact on the allocation. Such small changes often happen due to mea-
surement errors and the axiom requires that the solution be robust with respect to such errors.
Continuity: Given (G, v) ∈ P and a sequence {vt}∞t=1 of elements of VG, if for each e in G,
lim
t→∞ v
t(e) = v(e), then lim
t→∞ µ(G, v
t) = µ(G, v).
Continuity is a standard topological property in the fair allocation literature. In our
model, it has strong implications on both path selection rules and sharing rules. Both MYO-
ES and EFF-NT violate continuity. To see that, consider the problems in Figure 2. In the left
problem, for each  > 0, MYO-ES selects the top path and allocates (2 + 2 , 2 +

2 ); for each
 < 0, it selects the bottom path and allocates (1, 1). In the right problem, for each  > 0,
EFF-NT selects the top path and allocates (2 + , 0); for each  < 0, it selects the lower path
and allocates (0, 2).
(2 + , 0) (1,1)
(2, 0)
(2 + , 0)
(0, 2)
Figure 2: Problems illustrating that MYO-ES and EFF-NT violate continuity.
On the other hand, there is a large class of solutions meeting continuity. The following
example provides an interesting class of such solutions.
Example 2 (Solutions satisfying continuity). Consider a solution that selects paths depend-
ing on values of the paths, and divides the value of the selected path(s) continuously de-
pending on individual values of the agents in the network. For example, in a network with
T paths, the path with the T ∗-th largest value is selected, where T ∗ ≤ T may depend on T .
When T ∗ = 1, efficient paths are selected. When T ∗ = T, the least efficient paths are selected.
When T ∗ = bT+12 c,13 the paths with median value are selected whenever T is odd. After the
selection of a path(s), each agent receives a share in proportion to the sum of his individual
values over all edges in the network.
Formally, let ϕ be such that for each (G, v) ∈ P with paths L1, . . . , LT in G, L ∈ ϕ(G, v)
if and only if vN(L) is the T ∗-th largest number among vN(L1), . . . , vN(LT ). Let µ be such
that for each (G, v) ∈ P and each i ∈ N, µi(G, v) =
∑
e in G
vi(e)∑
j∈N
∑
e in G
v j(e)
vN(L) where L ∈ ϕ(G, v). The
solution (ϕ, µ) satisfies continuity.
13For each c ∈ R, bcc is the largest integer no more than c.
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Our main axiom in this section relates to the independence of the timing of redistribution.
Consider a process with a selected plan (path) involving at least two steps. The accounting
practice may require that interim payment be made in the middle of the plan. Thus, agents
receive two installments where the first installment is based on the “subproblem” from the
beginning to the middle of the plan, and the second one is based on the other subproblem
from the middle to the end of the plan. The axiom requires that agents are indifferent between
receiving a lump-sum payment at the end of the process or receiving the two installments.
This rules out renegotiation of agents at intermediate stages.
To formally define subproblems, let (G, v) ∈ P and let d be a node in G which is neither
the source nor a sink. We denote by G|d the maximum sub-network with d being the sink,
i.e., the sub-network which contains all the paths from the original source to node d, and let
v|d be the restriction of v to the edges in G|d. Analogously, we denote by G|d the maximum
sub-network with d being the source, i.e., the sub-network which contains all the paths from
node d to original sinks, and let v|d be the restriction of v to the edges in G|d. In the network
depicted in Figure 3, we illustrate G|d as the dotted sub-network and G|d the dashed sub-
network.
d
Figure 3: The dotted and dashed subnetworks illustrate G|d and G|d.
Sequential composition: Given (G, v) ∈ P and a path L ∈ ϕ(G, v). Let d be a node in L
which is neither the source nor a sink. Then µ(G, v) = µ(G|d, v|d) + µ(G|d, v|d).
There is a large class of rules meeting sequential composition. All the solutions intro-
duced in Example 1,14 including EFF-ES, EFF-NT, MYO-ES, and MYO-NT, satisfy this
axiom.
We now characterize the solutions that satisfy the three axioms above.
Theorem 1. A solution (ϕ, µ) satisfies non-triviality, continuity, and sequential composition
if and only if ϕ only selects efficient path(s), and there is α ∈ Rn+ with
∑
i∈N
αi = 1 such that for
each (G, v) ∈ P, µ(G, v) = vN(G)α.
14For all general solutions in Example 1, in non-generic cases where there are multiple maximum paths with
different values, a tie-breaking rule which selects the same path(s) in subproblems is needed.
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One implication, perhaps surprising, is that the efficient path selection is guaranteed with
three axioms that are seemingly unrelated to efficiency. Another interesting implication is
that the sharing is independent of the network configuration and individual values of the
agents.
The characterization is tight. Dropping sequential composition, a class of solutions meet-
ing non-triviality and continuity will be discussed in Theorem 2. Dropping continuity, EFF-
NT, MYO-ES, and MYO-NT meet non-triviality and sequential composition. Dropping non-
triviality, the solution that selects the path(s) with the smallest value and divides the value
equally among the agents meets continuity and sequential composition.
It follows readily from Theorem 1 that if in addition the solution satisfies a basic fairness
requirement that agents with the same individual values be assigned the same shares, then µ
is the ES rule.
Equal treatment of equals: For each (G, v) ∈ P and each pair i, j ∈ N, if for each e in G,
vi(e) = v j(e), then µi(G, v) = µ j(G, v).
Corollary 1. A solution (ϕ, µ) satisfies non-triviality, continuity, sequential composition,
and equal treatment of equals if and only if ϕ only selects efficient path(s), and for each
(G, v) ∈ P, µ(G, v) = vN (G)n 1.
2.2 Technology Monotonicity
We now propose a monotonicity axiom. It requires that no agent gets worse off from a
technology improvement which brings new steps and destinations to the existing network.
Formally, given (G, v) ∈ P, we say that (G′, v′) ∈ P is a technology improvement of (G, v)
if (i) G′ is constructed either by adding a parallel edge connecting two nodes in G or by
adding a sink and an edge going out from a node in G to this sink, and (ii) for each e in G,
v′(e) = v(e).
Technology monotonicity: For each (G, v), (G′, v′) ∈ P, if (G′, v′) is a technology improve-
ment of (G, v), then µ(G′, v′) ≥ µ(G, v).
Theorem 2. A solution (ϕ, µ) satisfies technology monotonicity if and only if ϕ only selects
efficient path(s), and there is a non-decreasing function f : R+ → Rn+ such that for each
(G, v) ∈ P, µ(G, v) = f (vN(G)).
It can be readily shown that the non-decreasing function f in Theorem 2 must be contin-
uous, so continuity is implied by technology monotonicity. In addition, if we require equal
treatment of equals, then µ must be the ES rule.
Corollary 2. A solution (ϕ, µ) satisfies technology monotonicity and equal treatment of
equals if and only if ϕ only selects efficient path(s), and for each (G, v) ∈ P, µ(G, v) = vN (G)n 1.
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2.3 Independence with respect to network transformation
We now consider some independence principles related to several types of network transfor-
mation.
Suppose that a step in a process consists of several substeps, and each agent’s value gen-
erated in the step is the sum of those generated in the substeps. In the network representation
of this process, such a step can be represented by a single edge that is assigned the sum of
the value vectors. Alternatively, it can be represented by several consecutive edges, each
assigned a corresponding substep value vector. We require that the two ways of formulating
this problem have no impact on the allocation.
Split invariance: Let G,G′ ∈ G be such that G′ is constructed by splitting an edge e in G into
two consecutive edges e1 and e2. If v ∈ VG and v′ ∈ VG′ are such that v(e) = v′(e1) + v′(e2),
and for each e′ in G other than e, v(e′) = v′(e′), then µ(G, v) = µ(G′, v′).
Equivalently, this requirement can be formulated as the merge invariance axiom: In each
problem, the allocation should not be affected by merging two consecutive edges, with no
ingoing and outgoing edges in between, into one edge and assigning to it the sum of the
value vectors of both edges. An immediate consequence of split invariance is that in each
problem where the network has a single path, the allocation only depends on the sum of the
value vectors over all edges at the path.
Our split invariance is different from the split and merge proofness axiom in the fair
allocation literature (Banker [4], Moulin [44], de Frutos [23], Ju [31], Sprumont [59], and
Chun [14]).15 In these problems, the resource is fixed, and a sharing rule is required to be
immune to the split of an agent into several participation units or the merge of several agents
into one participation unit.
The next axiom relates to network reduction due to an efficiency concern. Imagine that
in a problem, for each path in one “component” of the network, there is an outside path,
with the same number edges, in which the value vectors Pareto dominate those in the former
path edge by edge. In this case, we require that simplifying the problem by removing the
dominated component should not affect the allocation.
Formally, let (G, v), (G′, v′) ∈ P be given. We use (G, v) ∪ (G′, v′) to denote the problem
given by combing the sources of G and G′ into one source, and assigning the edges in the
combined network the same value vectors as in the respective individual problems. An
example is given in Figure 4. We say that a path L in (G, v) is stepwise dominated by a
path L′ in (G′, v′) if L and L′ have the same number of edges, say T ∈ N, and for each pair
of the t-th edges et in L and e′t in L
′, where t ∈ {1, ...,T }, v(ek)  v′(e′k).
Irrelevance of dominated paths: For each pair (G, v), (G′, v′) ∈ P, if each path in (G, v) is
stepwise dominated by a path in (G′, v′), then µ((G, v) ∪ (G′, v′)) = µ(G′, v′).
15Split or merge invariance is investigated in a unified framework of allocation problems by Ju, Miyagawa,
and Sakai [33].
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(G, v)
v(e1)
v(e2)
v(e3)
v(e4)
(G′, v′)
v′(e′1)
v′(e′2)
v′(e′3)
v′(e′4)
(G, v) ∪ (G′, v′)
v(e1)
v(e2)
v(e3)
v(e4)
v′(e′1)
v′(e′2)
v′(e′3)
v′(e′4)
Figure 4: Union of two problems
Suppose that after a problem has been solved, a new component of the network is found
to be available. To deal with this issue, one procedure is to cancel the initial allocation, and
then find a new allocation based on the complete problem that augments the original network
with the new component. An alternative procedure is to save the initial allocation, and then
select a new allocation based on the simplified problem that combines the new component
with an edge associated with the initial allocation. We require that both ways of dealing with
the issue lead to the same allocations so that agents have no dispute on which procedure is
better.
Parallel composition: For each pair (G, v), (G′, v′) ∈ P, µ((G, v)∪ (G′, v′)) = µ((e, µ(G, v))∪
(G′, v′)).
Parallel composition basically allows that a problem can be solved part by part. This is
reminiscent of the “lower composition” axiom in the rationing model (Young [63]) and the
“step by step negotiation” property in the axiomatic bargaining model (Kalai [38]).
Recall that the solutions characterized in the previous sections for each problem select
efficient path(s) and divide the value of the problem regardless of the network and individual
values. Such solutions trivially satisfy the three independence axioms. We now provide an
example meeting the axioms and taking into account individual values in a desirable way.
For the ease of illustration, we consider the case when n = 2 in Example 3. The general case
is discussed in Appendix A.2.
Example 3 (Solutions that depend on individual values). Consider a planner who selects the
efficient path(s) in a problem and divides the value in two steps. First, for each path in the
problem, the planner obtains a potential allocation that assigns to each agent the sum of his
12
individual values over all edges at the path. This gives a set of potential allocations induced
by all paths. Second, the planner selects an allocation based on the set of all potential
allocations according to the following three criteria of domination.
The first criterion is Pareto domination. An allocation is dominated by another allocation
if it is Pareto dominated by the other allocation. The second criterion relates to egalitarian-
ism. An allocation is dominated by another allocation if the latter has the same total value
as the former and is a convex combination of the former and the equal sharing allocation.
The third criterion relates to transitivity. If by either of the above two criteria, one allocation
is dominated by another allocation which is in turn dominated by a third one, then the first
allocation is also dominated by the third one.
The planner selects one potential allocation if every other potential allocation is dom-
inated by this one according to some criterion. Otherwise, the planner selects an outside
allocation by which each potential allocation is dominated. There are typically more than
one choice for the outside allocation, and the planner selects the one with the minimum
“departure” from the set of potential allocations, i.e., the one dominated by all the other
choices.16
The choice of the planner can be understood as rationalizble by a “preference order”
over all allocations which is determined by the three criteria. This preference order is in-
complete since some allocations may not be comparable by either criterion. The selected
allocation is exactly the least upper bound of the set of potential allocations according to
this partial order. Formally, let % be the binary relation on the set R2+ of all allocations
such that for each pair x, y ∈ R2+, x % y if there are z ∈ R2+ and λ ∈ [0, 1] such that
z1 + z2 = y1 + y2, and x ≥ z = λy + (1 − λ)y1 + y2n 1. (1)
Note that first for each pair x, y ∈ R2+, if x ≥ y, then x % y (the first criterion). Second, if
x1+x2 = y1+y2, then x % y if and only if x is a convex combination of y and x1+x22 1 (the second
criterion). The partial order % is the transitive closure (the third criterion) of the binary
relation defined by the previous two properties. Moreover, it can be shown that ( % ,R2+)
is a join-semilattice, so that the least upper bound of a finite number of allocations always
exist. Let (ϕ, µ) be such that for each (G, v) ∈ P, ϕ selects all efficient path(s) in (G, v),
and µ(G, v) = max
%
{ ∑
e in L
v(e) : L in G}. This solution satisfies split invariance, irrelevance
of dominated paths, parallel composition, and continuity. The proofs are given in Appendix
A.2.
For the problem in Figure 5(a), there is only one path, giving rise to one potential allo-
cations: (0, 2). Hence, (0, 2) is selected. For the problem in Figure 5(b), the two potential
allocations are (0, 2) and (1, 1). Clearly, (1, 1) is more egalitarian than (0, 2). Hence, (1, 1)
is selected. For the problem in Figure 5(c), the two potential allocations are (0, 2) and (2, 0).
Neither is dominated by the other. Hence, the planner needs to find an outside allocation. It
is not difficult to check that (1, 1) is the least upper bound of {(0, 2), (2, 0)}. Hence, (1, 1) is
16The existence of the outside allocation with the minimum departure is guaranteed. See the proof in Ap-
pendix A.2.
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(0, 2)
(a)
(1, 1)
(0, 2)
(b)
(2, 0)
(0, 2)
(c)
(2 − , 0)
(0, 2)
0 <  < 2
(d)
Figure 5: Illustration of the rationalizable solution
selected. For the problem in Figure 5(d), the two potential allocations are (0, 2) and (2−, 0).
Since 0 <  < 2, neither allocation is dominated by the other. Both potential allocations are
dominated by (1− 2 , 1+ 2 ), because it is more egalitarian than (0, 2), and it Pareto dominates
(1− 2 , 1− 2 ) which is more egalitarian than (2−, 0). Moreover, it is the least upper bound of{(0, 2), (2− , 0)}. Figure 6 shows that the intersection of the upper contour sets of (0, 2) and
(2 − , 0) is the upper contour set of (1 − 2 , 1 − 2 ). Hence, the planner selects (1 − 2 , 1 + 2 ).
The problems in Figure 5 clearly illustrates how the sharing can be jointly determined
by individual values at all paths (including inefficient ones). In Figure 5(a) where there is
only one path, the planner conducts no transfer. In Figure 5(c), an additional path becomes
available in Figure 5(c), at which the individual values of the two agents are reversed. Then
the planner selects the equal sharing allocation as a compromise between the two potential
allocations favoring different agents. In Figure 5(d), even if agent 1’s value at the additional
path is reduced by , so that the path becomes inefficient, the planner still takes the individual
values of this path into account and selects (1 − 2 , 1 + 2 ). When  goes to 0, the planner
treats them in equal and selects (1, 1) eventually.
In fact, the three independence axioms together with continuity characterize a class of
“rationalizable” solutions generalizing that in Example 3. The generalized solution allows a
redistribution to be applied on the set of potential allocations. Each solution in this general
class selects only efficient paths, and divides the value of each problem based on a “re-
14
x1
x2
{x : x % (1 − 2 , 1 + 2 )}
{x : x % (2 − , 0)}
{x : x % (0, 2)}
(0, 2)
(2, 0)(2 − , 0)
(1 − 2 , 1 + 2 )
(1, 1)
(1 − 2 , 1 − 2 )
Figure 6: The upper contour sets of (2 − , 0), (0, 2), and (1 − 2 , 1 + 2 ).
distribution function” and a partial order over the set of redistributed allocations. In each
problem, for each path, the planner applies the redistribution function to the no transfer al-
location given by the path and obtains a potential redistributed allocation. Then the optimal
allocation is selected, according to the partial order, based on the set of potential redistributed
allocations given by all paths.
Formally, r : Rn+ → Rn+ is a redistribution function if for each x ∈ Rn+,
∑
i∈N
ri(x) =
∑
i∈N
xi,
and r(r(x)) = r(x). Given a partial order % on a set S ⊆ Rn+ and a subset S ′ of S , we
denote by max
%
S ′ the join of S ′ when it exists. Given a redistribution function r and a
partial order % on r(Rn+), a solution (ϕ, µ) is said to be (r, % ) - rationalizable if (1) for
each pair x, y ∈ Rn+ with x ≥ y, r(x) % r(y), (2) (r(Rn+), % ) is a join-semilattice, and (3)
for each (G, v) ∈ P, µ(G, v) = x∗ := max
%
{r( ∑
e in L
v(e)) : L in G}, and ∑
i∈N
x∗i = vN(L) where
L ∈ ϕ(G, v). Moreover, (ϕ, µ) is said to be continuously (r, % ) - rationalizable if (ϕ, µ) is
(r, % ) - rationalizable, r is continuous and g : r(Rn+)2 → r(Rn+), defined by setting for each
(x, y) ∈ r(Rn+)2, g(x, y) = max% {x, y}, is continuous. Note that if (ϕ, µ) is continuously (r, % )
- rationalizable, then % is continuous.
All the solutions in the previous sections are rationalizable. For example, let f : R+ →
Rn+ be a non-decreasing function and (ϕ, µ) be a solution in Theorem 2. Define r : Rn+ → Rn+
by setting for each x ∈ Rn+, r(x) = f (
∑
i∈N
xi). Define % as a linear order on r(Rn+) such that
for each pair x, y ∈ r(Rn+), x % y if
∑
i∈N
xi ≥ ∑
i∈N
yi. Clearly, (ϕ, µ) is (r, % ) - rationalizable. If f
is also continuous, then (ϕ, µ) is continuously (r, % ) - rationalizable. This is the case for the
solutions in Theorem 1 where f assigns to each agent a fixed share of total values. Moreover,
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when n = 2, if r : R2+ → R2+ is the identity function and % is defined by condition (1), then
the solution in Example 3 is continuously (r, % ) - rationalizable. The proof with general n
can be found in the Appendix A.2.
Theorem 3. A solution (ϕ, µ) satisfies split invariance, irrelevance of dominated paths, in-
dependence, and continuity if and only if ϕ only selects efficient path(s), and there exist a
redistribution function r and a partial order % on r(Rn+) such that ϕ only select efficient
path(s) and (ϕ, µ) is continuously (r, % ) - rationalizable.
When the associated partial order of a solution in Theorem 3 is complete, it disregards
individual values in each problem and selects an allocation based only on the value of the
problem, like those in the previous sections. Such solutions are singled out from the ratio-
nalizable family by the next axiom which essentially implies the completeness of associated
partial orders. This axiom says that in each problem with only parallel paths, the allocation
depends only on one of the paths.
Irrelevance of parallel outside options: For each T ∈ N and each set {(Gt, vt) ∈ P :
Gt consists of a single path, t = 1, ...,T }, there is t′ ∈ {1, ...,T } such that µ( T⋃
t=1
(Gt, vt)) =
µ(Gt
′
, vt
′
).
Generically, if no two paths in the network have the same value, the allocation depends
only on the path selected. When this axiom is imposed in addition to those in Theorem 3,
split invariance and parallel composition become redundant.
Theorem 4. A solution (ϕ, µ) satisfies irrelevance of dominated paths, irrelevance of parallel
outside options, and continuity if and only if ϕ only selects efficient path(s), and there is a
continuous function f : R+ → Rn+ such that for each c ∈ R+,
∑
i∈N
fi(c) = c, and for each
(G, v) ∈ P, µ(G, v) = f (vN(G)).
The characterizations in both Theorem 3 and 4 are tight. Dropping split invariance, con-
sider the solution in Appendix A.2 (an n-agent version of Example 3) with a “redistribution
function” r that depends on not only the value vector but also on the number of edges in
the path that generate the value vector. That is, for each (G, v) ∈ P and each L in G, if the
number of edges in L is 2, then r divides equally among agents in group S 1 (S 1 ⊆ N) the
aggregate values generated by agents of the other group S 2 (S 2 = N \ S 1) along the path,
and among agents in S 2 those generated by agents of S 1; if the number of edges in L is other
than 2, then r agrees with the redistribution function in Appendix A.2. The solution with
modified redistribution function satisfies irrelevance of dominated paths, parallel composi-
tion, and continuity. Dropping irrelevance of dominated paths, the solution that selects all
the paths with the smallest values and divides the value equally among the agents satisfies
split invariance, parallel composition, irrelevance of parallel outside options, and continu-
ity. Dropping parallel composition, consider the solution that selects all the efficient paths
and divides the value to each agent in proportion to the maximum aggregate values he can
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generate over all the paths in a problem. This solution satisfies split invariance, irrelevance
of dominated paths, and continuity. Dropping continuity, consider a path selection rule that
picks in the first round the paths among all the efficient ones that maximizes agent 1’s in-
dividual aggregate values. Then, it picks among the selected ones in the first round those
maximizing agent 2’s individual aggregate values, and so on and so forth, to the n-th round.
The solution that adopts this path selection rule and assigns to the agents their individual ag-
gregate values along the selected path(s) satisfies split invariance, irrelevance of dominated
paths, parallel composition, and irrelevance of parallel outside options. Dropping irrelevance
of parallel outside options, the solution in Example 3 satisfies irrelevance of dominated paths
and continuity.
Lastly, as in the previous sections, equal treatment of equals single outs the equal sharing
rule.
Corollary 3. A solution (ϕ, µ) satisfies irrelevance of dominated paths, irrelevance of parallel
outside options, continuity, and equal treatment of equals if and only if ϕ only selects efficient
path(s), and for each (G, v) ∈ P, µ(G, v) = vN (G)n 1.
3 The model under incomplete information
Consider now that the planner has no information about the network and individual values
of agents, while the agents have full information. Thus, the planner may delegate agents to
collectively choose a path.17 After a path is realized, the planner observes individual values at
each edge only for that path and uses a predetermined sharing rule to redistribute the value of
the realized path. The agents collectively choose a path taking into account their information
and the redistribution scheme. We assume that the planner’s objective is to implement an
efficient path, which is desirable from both the positive and normative sides (Theorems 1-4).
The planner chooses a sharing rule that aligns the objective of the planner with the incentives
of the agents.
For example, consider profit sharing in a company. With limited information, a manager
(planner) may want the employees (agents) to collectively decide the priority of projects. A
compensation scheme (sharing rule) is set beforehand and depend only on the potential prof-
its brought by the agents (individual values). The manager selects a compensation scheme
to incentivize the employees to choose a profit-maximizing priority of projects.
Different from the previous setting, the path selection is irrelevant since the planner has
delegated the selection of path to the agents. Moreover, the sharing rule only depends on
sequences of individual values since the planner only observes the realized path. Formally,
a path is a finite sequence {xt}Tt=1 of elements of Rn+, where T ∈ N is the number of edges in
17A more classical way of implementing a path is to elicit the information from agents. Section 3.1 briefly
discusses this issue and ways to solve it. We focus here on a more decentralized setting where a complex
network may be difficult to elicit. Our analysis also applies to the scenario where the decision has to made by
agents regardless of the information of the planner. For example, a planner in charge of building a connected
public facility may only choose a sharing rule and have to delegate the agents to collectively choose (e.g. by
voting) a path.
17
the path and xt is the vector of individual values of the tth edge. We denote a typical path
by l, and the set of all paths by L. For each path l = {xt}Tt=1 in L, K ∈ N, let lN :=
T∑
t=1
∑
i∈N
xti
be the value of l. A sharing rule here is a function µ : L → Rn+ such that for each l ∈ L,∑
i∈N
µi(l) = lN .
Different from the classical implementation literature, we follow an axiomatic approach.
Our axioms ensures a variety of games to implement an efficient path.
The first axiom says that for each pair of paths, at least k agents should receive weakly
more assignments at the path with a larger value, where k is more than half of the number
of the agents. This is a stability requirement which is necessary to guarantee the selection
of the efficient path when agents are delegated to make a decision using a Condorcet voting
rule and other k-majoritarian rules, as we will see in Applications 1 and 2.
k-majority (
n
2
< k ≤ n): For each pair l, l′ ∈ L, if lN ≥ l′N , then there is N′ ⊂ N such that
|N′| ≥ k and for each i ∈ N′, µi(l) ≥ µi(l′).
A sharing rule meeting this axiom will be referred to as k-majoritarian. When k =
b n2c + 1, a majority of agents always prefer a more efficient path. When k = n, all agents
prefer a more efficient path.18
Application 1 (Path selection using a Condorcet Social Choice Function). Suppose that a
path is selected using a Social Choice Function (SCF) that satisfies the Condorcet property.
That is, the SCF elects a Condorcet winner when available.19
For each agent, a sharing rule determines an assignment for each path, which induces an
ordinal ranking over paths. Each k−majoritarian sharing rule guarantees that an efficient
path is a Condorcet winner regardless of the network and individual values. Therefore, each
SCF that meets the Condorcet property picks an efficient path. Conversely, if a rule is not
k−majoritarian for each k > n2 , then a SCF that meets the Condocret property may pick an
inefficient path.
Application 2 (Sequential voting). Suppose that agents vote step by step to decide a path.
For instance, agents vote sequentially for an route of a railway or other connected public
facility. More precisely, consider the dynamic game of complete information where at every
node agents vote on the direction to continue. A path is selected using a k-majoritarian
voting rule at every node (i.e., if a direction receives at least k-votes, then it is chosen). The
payoff of the agents is given by applying the sharing rule to the realized path.
18When k = n, we have an n-majority. It is reminiscent to the property of Pareto Nash Implementation (PNI)
in connection networks by Juarez and Kumar [36], that requires that the efficient Nash equilibrium be preferred
by all the agents over any other equilibrium.
19Formally, given the set of objects M, let R be the set of ordinal preferences over M. A social choice
function Ψ : RN → M meets the Condorcet property if for the preference profile = (1, . . . ,n) ∈ RN there
exists l∗ ∈ M such that for any l ∈ M, |{i ∈ N |l∗  l}| > n2 , then Ψ() = {l∗}. A large class of SCFs that satisfy
this property are discussed in Moulin [46].
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A k-majoritarian sharing rule will always implement an efficient path as a strong sub-
game perfect Nash equilibrium. Such an equilibrium is unique when there are no two paths
with the same values.
Finally, the implementation of the efficient path(s) is robust to voting only at a subset of
nodes. It is also robust to incomplete information of the agents about at which nodes voting
will occur.20
The following example shows some sharing rules satisfying k-majority.
Example 4 (Sharing rules satisfying k-majority).
i. Fix a priority group of at least k agents. Members of the priority group always equally
share the value of a path while the others get nothing. Formally, let S ⊆ N be such
that |S | ≥ k. For each path l and each i ∈ N,
µi(l) =
{ lN
|S | if i ∈ S ,
0 if i ∈ N \ S .
ii. Consider a sharing rule that depends on agents’ individual values rather than their
names. For each realized path, agents are classified into two groups: (1) the top group
with the top m agents who have the highest m accumulated individual values along
the path, and (2) the bottom group with the remaining n − m agents. Each top group
member shares equally the value of the realized path. The bottom group receives
nothing. Formally, let m ∈ N be such that k ≤ m ≤ n. Given l = {xt}Tt=1 and i ∈ N,
let li :=
∑
t lti be the accumulated value of agent i at the path l. For each path l with
li1 ≥ li2 ≥ · · · ≥ lin (break indifferences arbitrarily) and each i j ∈ N,
µi j(l) =
{ lN
m if 1 ≤ j ≤ m,
0 if m + 1 ≤ j ≤ n.
The rule µ satisfies k-majority, let l, l′ be two paths such that lN ≥ l′N . Then, the m
agents in the top group at l is assigned no less than at l′.
iii. The above rule can be generalized to admit more than two groups. For example, for
each realized path, agents are classified into three groups: (1) the top group with the
top q agents who have the highest q accumulated individual values, and analogously,
(2) the middle group with the subsequent m agents, where m ≥ k, and (3) the bottom
group with the remaining n− q−m agents. Agents in the same group receive the same
shares. Each middle group member receives the average value of the realized path.
20This problem often occurs when voters want to re-evaluate a chosen route after it has been partially built,
for instance in projects that take several years to construct, like the rail in Honolulu, from Ewa side to Waikiki
via Downtown. While the decision to build the rail from Honolulu to Ewa was approved by voters, their
construction stopped in the middle to re-evaluate the route chosen and to be confirmed by the voters before
further spending on the project occurs.
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Each bottom group member receives the average value subtracted by an amount that
is based on the “gaps” between top and middle groups as well as middle and bottom
groups. Each top group member receives the average value adjusted up by the amount
subtracted from the bottom group.
Formally, let q,m be non-negative integers such that q + m ≤ n and m ≥ k. Let
λ : R+ → [0, 1] be such that λ(0) = 0 and lim
c→∞ λ(c) = 1. For each path l with
li1 ≥ · · · ≥ lin (break indifferences arbitrarily) and each i j ∈ N,
µi j(l) =

lN
n +
n−q−m
q λ((liq − liq+1)(liq+m − liq+m+1)) lNn if 1 ≤ j ≤ q,
lN
n if q + 1 ≤ j ≤ q + m,
lN
n − λ((liq − liq+1)(liq+m − liq+m+1)) lNn if q + m + 1 ≤ j ≤ n.
If m < 1, then for each path l and each i ∈ N, µi(l) = lNn .21
We focus on sharing rules that are independent of the agents’ names. For instance, redis-
tribution schemes for sharing benefit of public facilities are often anonymous.
For permutation pi of N and each path l = {xt}Tt=1 in L, where T ∈ N, let lpi ∈ L be such
that for each t ∈ {1, ...,T } and each i ∈ N, xti = xtpi(i). Our second axiom formalizes the
requirement that a sharing rule be independent of the names of the agents.
Anonymity: For each permutation pi of N, each l ∈ L, and each i ∈ N, µi(l) = µpi(i)(lpi).
Anonymity is a desirable property, as agents have symmetric information. Thus, agents
should not be discriminated solely on the basis of names. On the other hand, this does not
prevent agents from being discriminated based on their individual values. Example 4 (i) does
not satisfy anonymity while Examples 4 (ii) and (iii) do.
We now move to the main result of this section. The combination of the above two axioms
lead to an important restriction on the sharing rules: at least k agents should be allocated the
average of the value of the path.
Proposition 1. If µ satisfies k-majority and anonymity, then for each l ∈ L, there is N′ ⊆ N
such that |N′| ≥ k and for each i ∈ N′, µi(l) = lNn .
When the population is small, in particular, when n = 3 or n = 4, Proposition 1 im-
plies that the equal sharing rule is the only rule meeting k-majority and anonymity. When
the population is large, the equal sharing rule can be characterized by adding either one of
the following axioms. These axioms include sequential composition in Section 2.1; a fair-
ness axiom that requires a more egalitarian sharing at a more egalitarian path; and a basic
monotonicity of a sharing rule with respect to transfers between agents.
21To see that µ satisfies k-majority, let l, l′ be two paths such that lN ≥ l′N . If an agent in the middle group
at l′ belongs to either the top or the middle group at l, then µ assigns no less to him at l than l′. If there are
agents in the middle group at l′ belonging to the bottom group at l, then there are equal number of agents in the
bottom group at l′ belonging to either the top or the middle group at l, so that they are assigned no less at l than
at l′. Hence, there are at least m agents who receive no less at l than at l′.
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Theorem 5. A rule µ is the equal sharing rule if and only if it satisfies k-majority, anonymity,
and either of the following axioms:
i. Sequential composition: For each l = {xt}Tt=1 in L, where T ∈ N, µ(l) =
∑
µ({xt}).
ii. Lorenz monotonicity: For each pair l = {xt}Tt=1 and l′ = {x
′t}Tt=1 in L, where T ∈ N, if
for each t ∈ {1, ...,T }, xt Lorenz x′t, then µ(l′) Lorenz µ(l).22
iii. Transfer monotonicity: For each pair i, i′ ∈ N, and each pair l = {xt}Tt=1 and l′ = {x
′t}Tt=1
in L, where T ∈ N, if for each t ∈ {1, ...,T }, x′ti − xti = xti′ − x
′t
i′ ≥ 0, and for each
j ∈ N \ {i, i′}, xtj = x
′t
j , then µi(l
′) ≥ µi(l).
3.1 Remarks about Information
So far, we have studied the case of complete information among agents. We can alternatively
consider the case where only a few of the agents have complete information about the net-
work and individual values. A natural mechanism to select a path is one that delegates the
more informed agents to decide which direction to continue. Consider a rule that incentivizes
the delegates to make the efficient decision regardless of the network and individual values.
It is easy to show that such a rule should allocate the delegates a share depending only on the
value of a path, while non-delegates can be given arbitrary shares. Moreover, we can show
that the equal sharing rule is the only anonymous rule in this class.
We can alternatively consider the problem where there is no agent with complete infor-
mation about the network and individual values. For instance, consider the case where agents
only know the network and their own values. In this setting, a more traditional approach from
the mechanism design literature would require agents to report their information to the plan-
ner, who will use this information to make an estimation of the values in the network and
select an efficient path —see Hougaard and Tvede [28, 29] for a related study of implemen-
tation of the efficient path in minimal cost spanning trees. A natural issue in this setting is to
find the mechanisms and sharing rules that incentivize agents to report their true information.
When agents are critical, that is, when they have information about the values at some edges
that no one else has, it is easy to prove that every mechanism is manipulable. On the other
hand, when agents are not critical, in particular, when for every edge there are at least three
agents who have information about all agent’s values on that edge, several mechanisms and
sharing rules can achieve truth telling as an equilibrium.
4 Conclusion
We have introduced the problem of division of sequential values and provided a comprehen-
sive study of it. In particular, we have addressed the problem from different perspectives,
22To define Lorenz, for each x ∈ Rn+, let x∗ ∈ Rn+ be such that for each i ∈ {1, ..., n}, x∗i is the i-th smallest
number of x1, ..., xn. For each pair x, y ∈ Rn+, we denote by x Lorenz y if for each m ∈ {1, ..., n},
m∑
i=1
x∗i ≥
m∑
i=1
y∗i .
See Hougaard [25] for recent applications of Lorenz monotonicity to allocation problems.
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including the complete and incomplete information case, and used old and new axioms from
other strands in the literature to characterize several classes of solutions not uncovered else-
where. An advantage of covering this problem from a wide variety of angles is that axioms
can be chosen according to relevancy of the application in mind. Our analysis highlights the
robustness of the EFF-ES solution, in both the complete and incomplete information settings.
This rule, however, is by no means the only rule when less stringent axioms are imposed. In-
deed, we have also characterized a class of solutions that take into account individual values
accumulated along all paths in a rationalizable way.
We see this work as opening new avenues of research in the distribution of sequential
costs and benefits, especially from the normative and positive angles. New classes of solu-
tions, like the ones uncovered in Examples 1 and 2, require further study.
A Appendix
A.1 Proofs of results
Proof of Theorem 1. The necessity is readily seen. We only check the sufficiency. Let (ϕ, µ)
satisfy non-triviality, continuity, and sequential composition. Let (G, v) ∈ P. Suppose
that there is a unique efficient path L in (G, v) and for each edge e in L, vN(e) > 0. Let
d1, e1, ..., dm, em, dm+1 be the consecutive nodes and edges in L.
We claim that ϕ(G, v) = {L}. To see it, let v1 ∈ VG be such that v1(e1) = v(e1), and for
each e ∈ G with e , e1, v1(e) = 0. By non-triviality, ∑
i∈N
µi(G, v1) > 0, and thus for each L′ ∈
ϕ(G, v1), e1 ∈ L′. For each λ ∈ (0, 1], let v2λ ∈ VG be such that v2λ(e2) = λv(e2) + (1 − λ)0,23
and for each e ∈ G with e , e2, v2λ(e) = v1(e). Thus, for each e ∈ G, lim
λ→0
v2λ(e) = v1(e). By
continuity, lim
λ→0
∑
i∈N
µi(G, v2λ) =
∑
i∈N
µi(G, v1(e)). Thus, when λ is sufficiently small, for each
L′ ∈ ϕ(G, v2λ), e1 ∈ L′, and by sequential composition and non-triviality, ∑
i∈N
µi(G, v2λ) =∑
i∈N
µi(G|d2 , v2λ|d2) +
∑
i∈N
µi(G|d2 , v2λ|d2) > vN(e1), so e2 ∈ L′. Let λ¯ := sup{λ′ ∈ (0, 1] : for
each λ ∈ (0, λ′] and each L′ ∈ ϕ(G, v2λ), e1, e2 ∈ L′}. Then, λ¯ > 0, and by continuity,∑
i∈N
µi(G, v2λ¯) = vN(e1) + λ¯vN(e2). If λ¯ < 1, then there is a sequence {λt}∞t=1 of elements of
(λ¯, 1] such that lim
t→∞ λt = λ¯, and for each t ∈ N, there is L
′ ∈ ϕ(G, v2λt) such that either e1 < L′
or e2 < L′. Thus, lim sup
t→∞
∑
i∈N
µi(G, v2λt) < vN(e1)+ λ¯vN(e2) =
∑
µi(G, v2λ¯), which is a violation
of continuity. Hence, λ¯ = 1, and
∑
i∈N
µi(G, v2) = vN(e1) + vN(e2). Thus, for each L′ ∈ ϕ(G, v2),
e1, e2 ∈ L′.
For each λ ∈ [0, 1], let vˆλ ∈ VG be such that for each e ∈ L, vˆλ(e) = v(e), and for each
e < L, vˆλ(e) = λv(e) + (1 − λ)0. By applying the above argument repeatedly, L ∈ ϕ(G, vˆ0).
By continuity, when λ is sufficiently small, L ∈ ϕ(G, vˆλ). Let λˆ := {λ′ ∈ [0, 1] : for each
λ ∈ [0, λ′], L ∈ ϕ(G, vˆλ)}. By continuity, L ∈ ϕ(G, vˆλˆ). If λˆ < 1, then there is a sequence
23We denote by c, c ∈ R, the n-dimensional vector in which each coordinate equals c.
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{λt} of elements of (λˆ, 1] such that lim
t→∞ λt = λˆ and for each t ∈ N, L < ϕ(G, vˆ
λt). Since
lim
t→∞ maxL′∈G,L′,L
vˆλtN (L
′) = max
L′∈G,L′,L
vˆλˆN(L
′) ≤ max
L′∈G,L′,L
vˆ1N(L
′) < vN(L), then lim sup
t→∞
∑
i∈N
µi(G, vˆλt) <
vN(L) =
∑
µi(G, vˆλˆ), which is a violation of continuity. Hence, λˆ = 1, and L ∈ ϕ(G, v). Since
L is the unique efficient path in (G, v), then ϕ(G, v) = {L}.
To see that there is α ∈ Rn+ with
∑
i∈N
αi = 1 such that µ(G, v) = vN(G)α, let G′ ∈ G
be as in Figure 7. That is, G′ is obtained by adding a new source d0, a new parallel path
L′ with d0, e′1, d
′
1, e
′
2, d
′
2 being the consecutive nodes and edges in L
′, and a new edge e0
going out from d0 and going into d1, followed by the orginal network G. For each λ ≤
G
d1 d2 dm dm+1
d′2
e1 e2 em
d0
d′1
e0
e′1
e′2
Figure 7: Incremented network G′ based on G
vN (G)
n , let v
′λ ∈ VG′ be such that for each e ∈ G, v′λ(e) = v(e), v′λ(e0) = v′λ(e′1) = 0, and
v′λ(e′2) = (
vN (G)
n − λ)1. Note that whenever λ > 0, L incremented by d0 and e0 is the unique
efficient path in (G′, v′λ). By sequential composition, µ(G′, v′λ) = µ(G, v). By continuity,
µ(G′, v′0) = µ(G, v). Whenever λ < 0, L′ is the unique efficient path in G′. By continuity and
sequential composition, µ(G′, v′0) = µ(e, vN (G)n 1). Thus, µ(G, v) = µ(e,
vN (G)
n 1).
Let c, c′ ∈ R+, G¯ ∈ G be as in Figure 8, and v¯ ∈ VG¯ be such that v¯(e1) = c+c′n 1,
v¯(e2) = 0, v¯(e′1) =
c
n1, and v¯(e
′
2) =
c′
n 1. By continuity and sequential composition, µ(G¯, v¯) =
µ(e, c+c
′
n 1) = µ(e,
c
n1) + µ(e,
c′
n 1). Thus, for each i ∈ N, fi : R+ → R+ defined by setting
for each c ∈ R+, fi(c) = µi(e, cn1) is additive, and by continuity, it is continuous. Hence,
there is αi ∈ R such that for each c ∈ R+, fi(c) = αic. Since for each c > 0 and i ∈ N,
fi(c) ≥ 0, and ∑
i∈N
fi(c) = c, then for each i ∈ N, αi ≥ 0, and ∑
i∈N
αi = 1. Hence, for each i ∈ N,
µi(G, v) = fi(
vN (G)
n ) = αivN(G).
Lastly, suppose that there are multiple efficient paths in (G, v) or there are some edges
of zero value in an efficient path. Let {vt}∞t=1 be a sequence of elements of VG such that for
each k, (G, v) has a unique efficient path, each edge of which has a positive value, and for
each edge e in G, lim
t→∞ v
t(e) = v(e). Thus, for each t ∈ N, µ(G, vt) = vtN(G)α. By continuity,
µ(G, v) = vN(G)α. This also shows that each path in ϕ(G, v) is efficient.
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d1 d2 d3
d′2
e1
c+c′
n 1
e2
0
e′1
c
n1
e′2
c′
n 1
Figure 8: Problem (G¯, v¯)
Proof of Theorem 2. We shall only check the sufficiency. Suppose that (ϕ, µ) satisfies tech-
nology improvement. Define f : R+ → Rn+ by setting for each c ∈ R+, f (c) = µ(e, cn1). Let
(G, v) ∈ P. We claim that µ(G, v) = f (vN(G)).
Let (G′, v′) ∈ P be a technology improvement of (G, v) where G′ is constructed by adding
an edge e′ going out from the source to a sink in G, and v′(e′) = vN (G)n 1. By technology
monotonicity, µ(G′, v′) ≥ µ(G, v). Since v′N(G) = vN(G), then µ(G′, v′) = µ(G, v). Note that
there is a finite sequence {(Gt, vt)}Tt=1, T ∈ N, of elements of P such that (G1, v1) = (e, vN (G)n 1),
(GT , vT ) = (G′, v′), and for each t = 2, ...,T , (Gt, vt) is a technological improvement of
(Gt−1, vt−1). By applying technology monotonicity repeatedly, µ(G′, v′) ≥ µ(e, vN (G)n 1). Since
v′N(G) = vN(G), then µ(G
′, v′) = µ(e, vN (G)n 1). Hence, µ(G, v) = µ(e,
vN (G)
n 1) = f (vN(G)). This
also shows that each path in ϕ(G, v) is efficient.
Proof of Theorem 3. We shall only prove the sufficiency. Define r : Rn+ → Rn+ by setting for
each x ∈ Rn+, r(x) = y if µ(e, x) = y. Clearly,
∑
i∈N
xi =
∑
i∈N
yi. By continuity, r is continuous.
Suppose that r(x) = y for some x ∈ Rn+. Then by parallel composition, µ((e, x) ∪ (e′, x)) =
µ((e, y) ∪ (e′, x)) = µ((e, y) ∪ (e′, y)). By irrelevance of dominated paths and continuity,
µ((e, x) ∪ (e′, x)) = µ(e, x) and µ((e, y) ∪ (e′, y)) = µ(e, y). Thus, µ(e, y) = µ(e, x) = y. Hence,
r(y) = y.
Define % on r(Rn+) by setting for each pair x, y ∈ r(Rn+), y % x if µ((e, x) ∪ (e′, y)) = y.
We claim that % is a partial order. Since for each y ∈ r(Rn+), µ((e, y) ∪ (e′, y)) = y, then %
is reflexive. By definition, % is antisymmetric. To see % is transitive, let x, y, z ∈ r(Rn+) be
such that y % x and z % y, and let z′ := µ((e, x)∪ (e′, z)). By parallel composition, irrelevance
of dominated paths and continuity,
µ((e1, z) ∪ (e2, x) ∪ (e3, y) ∪ (e4, z))
=µ((e1, z) ∪ (e2, x) ∪ (e3, z))
=µ((e1, z) ∪ (e2, x)) = z′,
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and
µ((e1, z) ∪ (e2, x) ∪ (e3, y) ∪ (e4, z))
=µ((e1, z) ∪ (e2, x) ∪ (e3, y))
=µ((e1, z) ∪ (e2, y)) = z.
Hence, z′ = z. Thus, z % x as desired. By parallel composition and irrelevance of dominated
paths, for each pair x, y ∈ Rn+ such that x > y, µ((e, r(x)) ∪ (e′, r(y))) = µ((e, x) ∪ (e′, y)) =
µ(e, x) = r(x), so r(x) % r(y). Since % is continuous, for each pair x, y ∈ Rn+ such that x ≥ y,
r(x) % r(y).
To see that (r(Rn+), % ) is a join-semilattice, let x, y ∈ r(Rn+) and z := µ((e, x) ∪ (e′, y)).
We claim that z = max
%
{x, y}. By parallel composition, irrelevance of dominated paths, and
continuity,
µ((e1, z)) = µ((e1, z) ∪ (e2, z))
=µ((e1, x) ∪ (e2, y) ∪ (e3, x) ∪ (e4, y))
=µ((e1, x) ∪ (e2, y)) = z,
and
µ((e1, x) ∪ (e2, z))
=µ((e1, x) ∪ (e2, y) ∪ (e3, x))
=µ((e1, x) ∪ (e2, y)) = z.
Hence, z ∈ r(Rn+) and z % x. Similarly, z % y. If there is z′ ∈ r(Rn+) such that z′ % x and
z′ % y, then by parallel composition,
µ((e1, z′) ∪ (e2, z))
=µ((e1, z′) ∪ (e2, x) ∪ (e3, y))
=µ((e1, z′) ∪ (e3, y)) = z′.
Hence, z′ % z. Thus, z = max
%
{x, y} ∈ r(Rn+) as desired.
Let (G, v) ∈ P. We claim that ϕ only selects efficient path(s). If vN(G) = 0, then we
are done. Suppose that vN(G) > 0. Let {L1, ..., Lm}, m ∈ N, be the set of paths in (G, v).
For each j ∈ {1, ...,m}, we denote by (L j, v j) the problem consisted of a single path L j such
that for each edge e in L, v j(e) = v(e). By irrelevance of dominated paths and continuity,
µ(G, v) = µ(
m⋃
j=1
(L j, v j) ∪ (G, v)) = µ(
m⋃
j=1
(L j, v j)).
For each λ ∈ [0, 1] and each j ∈ {1, ...,m}, let xλ j := ∑
e in L j
v(e) if vN(L j) = vN(G),
and xλ j := λ
∑
e in L j
v(e) + (1 − λ)0 if vN(L j) < vN(G). When λ = 1, we simply write x j
for x1 j. By split invariance, µ(G, v) = µ(
m⋃
j=1
(e j, x j)). By irrelevance of dominated paths,
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the
∑
i∈N
µi(
m⋃
j=1
(e j, x0 j)) = vN(G). Let λ¯ := sup{λ ∈ [0, 1] : ∑
i∈N
µi(
m⋃
j=1
(e j, xλ j)) = vN(G)}. By
continuity,
∑
i∈N
µi(
m⋃
j=1
(e j, xλ¯ j)) = vN(G). Suppose that λ¯ < 1. Then, there is  > 0 such that for
each λ > λ¯,
∑
i∈N
µi(
m⋃
j=1
(e j, xλ j)) ≤ vN(G) − , which is a violation of continuity. Hence, λ¯ = 1,
and µi(G, v) = µi(
m⋃
j=1
(e j, x j)) = vN(G).
Next, we claim µ(G, v) = max
%
{r(x j) : j = 1, ...,m}. Let z := µ(⋃mj=1(e j, x j)). It suffices to
show that z = max
%
{r(x j) : j = 1, ...,m}. By parallel composition, irrelevance of dominated
paths, and continuity, µ(e, z) = z, and for each j′ ∈ {1, ...,m},
µ((e, z) ∪ (e′, r(x j′)))
=µ(
m⋃
j=1
(e j, x j) ∪ (e′, x j′))
=µ(
m⋃
j=1
(e j, x j)) = z.
Hence, z ∈ r(Rn+) and for each j′ ∈ {1, ...,m}, z % r(x j′). If there is z′ ∈ r(Rn+) such that for
each j′ ∈ {1, ...,m}, z′ % r(x j′), then by parallel composition,
µ((e, z) ∪ (e′, z′)) = µ(
m⋃
j=1
(e j, x j) ∪ (e′, z′))
=µ(
m⋃
j=1
(e j, r(x j)) ∪ (e′, z′)) = z′,
so z′ % z as desired. Therefore, (ϕ, µ) is (r, % ) - rationalizable. By continuity, (ϕ, µ) is
continuously (r, % ) - rationalizable.
Proof of Theorem 4. We shall only check the sufficiency. Let (ϕ, µ) satisfy irrelevance of
dominated paths, irrelevance of parallel outside options, and continuity. For each (G, v) ∈ P
and each L in G, we denote by (L, vL) the problem consisting of the single path L and vL
such that for each edge e in L, vL(e) = v(e). By irrelevance of dominated paths and con-
tinuity, for each (G, v) ∈ P, µ(G, v) = µ( ⋃
L in G
(L, vL)). Moreover, by a similar argument as
in the the proof of Theorem 3, ϕ selects only efficient path(s). Let (G, v), (G′, v′) ∈ P. Let
L∗ be an efficient path in (G′, v′) ∪ (G, v) and for each  > 0, v ∈ VL∗ be such that for
each e in L∗, v(e) = v(e) + 1 if L∗ is in G, and v(e) = v′(e) + 1 if L∗ is in G′. Suppose
that L∗ is in G′. By continuity, µ((G, v)∪ (G′, v′)) = lim
↓0
µ((
⋃
L in G
(L, vL))∪ ( ⋃
L in G′,L,L∗
(L, v′L))∪
(L∗, v)). Since ϕ selects only efficient path(s), then by irrelevance of parallel outside options,
µ((G, v)∪(G′, v′)) = lim
↓0
µ(L∗, v) = µ(L∗, vL
∗
). Similarly, µ((e, µ(G, v))∪(G′, v′)) = µ(L∗, vL∗),
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and thus µ((G, v) ∪ (G′, v′)) = µ((e, µ(G, v)) ∪ (G′, v′)). Suppose that L∗ is in G. Then
µ((G, v) ∪ (G′, v′)) = lim
↓0
µ((
⋃
L in G,L,L∗
(L, vL)) ∪ ( ⋃
L in G′
(L, v′L)) ∪ (L∗, v)) = µ(L∗, vL∗). More-
over, µ((e, µ(G, v)) ∪ (G′, v′)) = lim
↓0
µ((e, µ(G, v) + 1) ∪ (G′, v′)) = lim
↓0
µ((e, µ(G, v) + 1) ∪
(
⋃
L in G′
(L, v′L))) = lim
↓0
µ(e, µ(G, v) + 1) = µ(e, µ(G, v)). For each  > 0, µ((e, µ(G, v) +
1) ∪ (L∗, vL∗)) = µ(e, µ(G, v) + 1) and µ((e, µ(G, v)) ∪ (L∗, v)) = µ(L∗, v). By conti-
nuity, µ((e, µ(G, v)) ∪ (L∗, vL∗)) = µ(e, µ(G, v)) = µ(L∗, vL∗). Hence, µ((G, v) ∪ (G′, v′)) =
µ((e, µ(G, v)) ∪ (G′, v′)). Thus, (ϕ, µ) satisfies parallel composition.
Moreover, we claim that (ϕ, µ) satisfies split invariance. It suffices to show that for each
(G, v) ∈ P, µ( ⋃
L in G
(L, vL)) = µ(
⋃
L in G
(eL,
∑
e in L
v(e))). Let (G, v) ∈ P and L be a path in G.
By parallel composition, it suffices to show that µ(L, vL) = µ(eL,
∑
e in L
v(e)). For each  >
0, let v ∈ VL be such that for each e in L, v(e) = vL(e) + 1. Then, for each  > 0,
µ((L, v)∪ (eL, ∑
e in L
v(e))) = µ(L, v) and µ((L, vL)∪ (eL, ∑
e in L
v(e) + 1)) = µ(eL,
∑
e in L
v(e) + 1).
By continuity, µ((L, vL) ∪ (eL, ∑
e in L
v(e))) = µ(L, vL) = µ(eL,
∑
e in L
v(e)), as desired.
Since (ϕ, µ) satisfies both split invariance and parallel composition, then by Theorem 3,
there exist a redistribution function r and a partial order % on r(Rn+) such that for each pair
x, y ∈ Rn+ with x ≥ y, r(x) % r(y), and (ϕ, µ) is continuously (r, % ) - rationalizable. By
irrelevance of parallel outside options, for each pair x, y ∈ r(Rn+), either µ((e, x) ∪ (e′, y)) =
µ(e, x) = x or µ((e, x)∪ (e′, y)) = µ(e′, y) = y. Since r is continuous, then r(Rn+) is connected.
Then by Eilenberg [19],24 there is a one-to-one and continuous mapping g : r(Rn+)→ R.
We claim that for each pair x, y ∈ Rn+ such that
∑
i∈N
xi =
∑
i∈N
yi, r(x) = r(y). Suppose to the
contrary that x, y ∈ Rn+,
∑
i∈N
xi =
∑
i∈N
yi, and r(x) , r(y). Thus,
∑
i∈N
xi > 0. Let z ∈ Rn+ be such
that
∑
i∈N
zi <
∑
i∈N
xi, so r(z) , r(x) and r(z) , r(y). For each pair (x′, x′′) ∈ {(x, y), (y, z), (z, x)},
let D(x′,x′′) := {λx′ + (1 − λ)x′′ : λ ∈ [0, 1]}. Since r is continuous and D(x′,x′′) is convex,
then r(D(x′,x′′)) is path-connected. Since r(D(x′,x′′)) is a Hausdorff space, then r(D(x′,x′′)) is
arc-connected. Thus, there is a function h(x′,x′′) : [0, 1] → r(D(x′,x′′)) such that h(x′,x′′)(0) =
r(x′), h(x′,x′′)(1) = r(x′′), and h(x′,x′′) is a homeomorphism between [0, 1] and h(x′,x′′)([0, 1]).
Note that h(x,y)([0, 1]) ∩ h(y,z)([0, 1]) = {r(y)}, h(x,y)([0, 1]) ∩ h(z,x)([0, 1]) = {r(x)}, and A :=
h(x,y)([0, 1]) ∪ h(y,z)([0, 1]) ∪ h(z,x)([0, 1]) is connected. Since g is continuous, then g(A) is an
interval. Since g is one-to-one, then there is c¯ ∈ (0, 1) such that g(h(x,y)(c¯)) is an interior point
of g(A), and thus g(A \ h(x,y)(c¯)) is not connected. Since A \ h(x,y)(c¯) is connected and g is
continuous, then g(A \ h(x,y)(c¯)) is connected, which is a contradiction.
Define f : R+ → Rn+ by setting for each c ∈ R+, f (c) = r( cn1). For each (G, v) ∈ P, since
µ(G, v) = max
%
{r( ∑
e in L
v(e)) : L in G}, then by the result proved in the previous paragraph,
µ(G, v) = max
%
{ f (vN(L)) : L in G}. Recall that for each pair x, y ∈ Rn+ with x ≥ y, r(x) % r(y).
Thus, µ(G, v) = f (vN(G)).
24See his Theorem I and (6.1).
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The following lemma is used in the proof of Proposition 1.
Lemma 1. Let c > 0 and X ⊆ ∆ = {x ∈ Rn+ :
∑
i∈N
xi = c}. Suppose that (i) cn1 ∈ X, (ii) for
each pair x, y ∈ X, there is N′ ⊆ N such that |N′| ≥ k and for each i ∈ N′, xi ≥ yi, and (iii)
for each permutation pi of N and each x ∈ X, xpi defined by setting for each i ∈ N, xpii = xpi(i)
belongs to X. Then, for each x ∈ X, there is N′ ⊆ N such that |N′| ≥ k and for each i ∈ N′,
xi = cn .
Proof. By assumption (ii), for each pair x, y ∈ X, |{i ∈ N : xi > yi}| ≤ n − k, |{i ∈ N : xi <
yi}| ≤ n − k, and thus
|{i ∈ N : xi = yi}| ≥ 2k − n. (2)
For each x ∈ X, N x> := {i ∈ N : xi > cn }, N x< := {i ∈ N : xi < cn }, and N x= := {i ∈ N : xi = cn }.
Let x ∈ X. By assumption (i), |N x>| ≤ n − k, |N x<| ≤ n − k, and |N x=| ≥ 2k − n. Suppose to the
contrary that |N x=| < k.
If |N x=| ≥ n2 , then let pi be a permutation on N such that for each i ∈ N x> ∪ N x<, pi(i) ∈ N x=.
By assumption (iii), xpi ∈ X. Note that N x> ∪ N x< ⊆ N xpi= and N xpi> ∪ N xpi< ⊆ N x= (see Figure 9).
N {i ∈ N : xi = xpii }
N x= N
x
> ∪ N x<
N x
pi
< ∪ N xpi> N xpi=
Figure 9: Permutation pi of N
Thus, |{i ∈ N : xi = xpii }| = |N x=| − |N x>| − |N x<| = |N x=| − (n − |N x=|) < 2k − n, which violates
(2).
If |N x=| < n2 , assume that |N x>| ≤ |N x<| ≤ |N x=|. Let pi be a permutation of N such that
for each i ∈ N x=, pi(i) ∈ N x> ∪ N x<, and for each i ∈ N x<, pi(i) ∈ N x= (see Figure 10). Since
|N x>| ≤ |N x=| < n2 < |N x> ∪ N x<|, then for each i ∈ N x>, pi(i) ∈ N x< ∪ N x=. Hence, for each i ∈ N,
xi , xpii , which violates (2). A similar contradiction can be obtained when |N x<| ≤ |N x>| ≤ |N x=|,
and when |N x=| < |N x>| or |N x=| < |N x<|, since both |N x>| and |N x<| are less than n2 .
Proof of Proposition 1. Let l ∈ L and c := lN . Let X = {µ(l′) : l′ ∈ L, l′N = c}. By
anonymity, assumptions (i) and (iii) of Lemma 1 are satisfied. By k-majority, assumption
(ii) is also satisfied. By Lemma 1, there is N′ ⊆ N such that |N′| ≥ k and for each i ∈ N′,
µi(l) = cn .
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NN x> N
x
< N
x
=
N x
pi
= N
xpi
> N
xpi
<
Figure 10: Permutation pi of N
Proof of Theorem 5. We only check the sufficiency. Let µ satisfy k-majority and anonymity.
Suppose that µ satisfies sequential composition. For each l ∈ L, let N l= := {i ∈ N : µi(l) =
lN
n } and N l, := N \ N l=. Suppose to the contrary that there is l′ ∈ L such that N l
′
, , ∅. By
Theorem 1, |N l′= | ≥ k ≥ |N l′, |. Let pi be a permutation on N such that for each i ∈ N l′, , pi(i) ∈ N l′= .
Let l¯ ∈ L be a path that connects l′ and l′pi. By sequential composition, µ(l¯) = µ(l′) + µ(l′pi).
Thus, N l¯= = N
l′
= ∩ N l
′pi
= , so N
l¯
, , ∅ and |N l¯=| = |N l′= | − |N l′, | < |N l′= | (see Figure 11). Repeating
N {i ∈ N : µi(l′) = µl′pii = l
′
N
n }
N l
′
= N
l′
,
N l
′pi
, N
l′pi
=
N {i ∈ N : µi(l¯) = 2l
′
N
n }
N l¯=
Figure 11: Permutation pi of N
the argument, there is l′′ ∈ L such that N l′′, , ∅ and |N l′′= | < |N l′= |. Within finitely many steps,
we can find lˆ ∈ L such that |N lˆ=| < k, which is a violation of Proposition 1.
Suppose that µ satisfies Lorenz monotonicity. Let l = {xt}Tt=1, where T ∈ N. Let l′ ={x′t}Tt=1 be such that for each t ∈ {1, ...,T } and each i ∈ {1, ..., n − 1}, x
′t
i = 0 and x
′t
n =
∑
i∈N
x
′t
i .
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By construction, for each t ∈ {1, ...,T }, xt Lorenz x′t. By anonymity, for each pair i, j ∈
{1, ..., n − 1}, µi(l′) = µ j(l′). By Proposition 1, for each i ∈ {1, ..., n − 1}, µi(l′) = l
′
N
n =
lN
n , and
thus µn(l′) = lNn . By Lorenz monotonicity,
lN
n 1 Lorenz µ(l). Hence, µ(l) =
lN
n 1.
Suppose that µ satisfies transfer monotonicity. Let l = {xt}Tt=1, where T ∈ N. For each
j ∈ N, let l j = {x′t}Tt=1 be such that for each t ∈ {1, ...,T } and each i ∈ N \ { j}, x
′t
i = 0 and
x
′t
j =
∑
i∈N
x
′t
i . By anonymity and Proposition 1, µ j(l
j) = lNn . By transfer monotonicity, for each
j ∈ N, µ j(l) ≤ µ j(l j). Thus, µ(l) = lNn 1.
A.2 Local egalitarianism with transfers — an n-agent version of Exam-
ple 3.
Imagine that n agents are divided into two groups according to their exogenous types. Con-
sider the redistribution function that divides equally within each group the sum of the values
of its group members. For instance, a partnership firm runs two businesses and adopts the
equal sharing rule respectively for its partners involved in each business (Burrows and Black
[12], Baskenille-Morley and Beechey [6]).
Formally, let S 1, S 2 ⊆ {1, ..., n} be such that S 1, S 2 , ∅, S 1 ∩ S 2 = ∅, and S 1 ∪ S 2 =
{1, ..., n}. Define r : Rn+ → Rn+ by setting for each x ∈ Rn+, each j ∈ {1, 2}, and each i ∈ S j,
ri(x) = 1|S j |
∑
i∈S j
xi. When n = 2, r is simply the identity mapping that assigns to both agents
their individual values.
Define a binary relation % on r(Rn+) by setting for each pair x, y ∈ r(Rn+), x % y if there
are z ∈ r(Rn+) and λ ∈ [0, 1] such that
∑
i∈N
zi =
∑
i∈N
yi, and x ≥ z = λy + (1 − λ)
∑
i∈N
yi
n
1.
Note that for each pair x, y ∈ r(Rn+), if x ≥ y, then x % y. Moreover, if
∑
i∈N
xi =
∑
i∈N
yi, then
x % y if and only if x is a convex combination of y and
∑
i∈N
xi
n 1.
Let m := |S 1|. Then, |S 2| = n − m. Assume without loss of generality that 1 ∈ S 1 and
2 ∈ S 2.
Lemma 2. For each pair x, y ∈ r(Rn+), x % y if and only if
∑
i∈N
xi ≥ ∑
i∈N
yi, x1 ≥ min{y1,
∑
i∈N
yi
n },
and x2 ≥ min{y2,
∑
i∈N
yi
n }.
Proof. The “only if” direction is easy to check. To see the “if” direction, let x, y ∈ r(Rn+)
be such that
∑
i∈N
xi ≥ ∑
i∈N
yi, x1 ≥ min{y1,
∑
i∈N
yi
n }, and x2 ≥ min{y2,
∑
i∈N
yi
n }. Suppose first that
y1 ≤
∑
i∈N
yi
n . Then, y2 ≥
∑
i∈N
yi
n , x1 ≥ y1, and x2 ≥
∑
i∈N
yi
n . If x2 ≥ y2, then x ≥ y, and thus x % y. If
x2 < y2, then my1 + (n−m)x2 ≤ my1 + (n−m)y2 ≤ mx1 + (n−m)x2. Hence, there is c ∈ [y1, x1]
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such that mc + (n − m)x2 = ∑ yi. Let z ∈ r(Rn+) be such that for each i ∈ S 1, zi = c, and for
each i ∈ S 2, zi = x2. Then, x ≥ z, ∑
i∈N
zi =
∑
i∈N
yi, and y1 ≤ z1. Since x2 ≥
∑
i∈N
yi
n , then z1 ≤
∑
i∈N
yi
n .
Thus, there is λ ∈ [0, 1] such that z = λy + (1 − λ)
∑
i∈N
yi
n . Hence, x % y. A similar arguments
apply to the case of y1 >
∑
i∈N
yi
n .
Proposition 2. The relation % is a partial order, and (r(Rn+), % ) is a join-semilattice.
Proof. By definition, % is reflexive. To see % is antisymmetric, let x, y ∈ r(Rn+) be such
that x % y and y % x. By Lemma 2, ∑
i∈N
xi =
∑
i∈N
yi. Suppose that y1 ≤
∑
i∈N
yi
n . Then, y2 ≥
∑
i∈N
yi
n .
Since x % y, then by Lemma 2, x1 ≥ y1, x2 ≥
∑
i∈N
yi
n , and thus x1 ≤
∑
i∈N
yi
n . Since y % x, then
by Lemma 2, y1 ≥ x1. Hence, x1 = y1, and thus x = y. A similar argument holds when
y1 >
∑
i∈N
yi
n . To see that % is transitive, let x, y, z ∈ r(Rn+) be such that x % y and y % z. By
Lemma 2,
∑
i∈N
xi ≥ ∑
i∈N
yi ≥ ∑
i∈N
zi, x1 ≥ min{y1,
∑
i∈N
yi
n } ≥ min{min{z1,
∑
i∈N
zi
n },
∑
yi
n } = min{z1,
∑
i∈N
zi
n },
and x2 ≥ min{y2,
∑
i∈N
yi
n } ≥ min{min{z2,
∑
i∈N
zi
n },
∑
i∈N
yi
n } = min{z2,
∑
i∈N
zi
n }. Again by Lemma 2, x % z.
Hence, % is a partial order.
To see that (r(Rn+), % ) is a join-semilattice, let x, y ∈ r(Rn+). Suppose without loss
of generality that
∑
i∈N
xi ≥ ∑
i∈N
yi. Let med denote the operator that takes the median of
an odd number of real numbers. Let z∗ ∈ r(Rn+) be such that for each i ∈ S 1, z∗i =
med{min{y1,
∑
i∈N
yi
n }, x1, 1m [
∑
i∈N
xi − (n − m) min{y2,
∑
i∈N
yi
n }]}, and for each i ∈ S 2, z∗i =
∑
i∈N
xi−mz∗1
n−m .
We claim that z∗ = max
%
{x, y}. Since ∑
i∈N
xi ≥ ∑
i∈N
yi, then min{y2,
∑
i∈N
yi
n } ≤
∑
i∈N
yi
n ≤
∑
i∈N
xi
n , and thus
1
m
[
∑
i∈N
xi − (n − m) min{y2,
∑
i∈N
yi
n
}] ≥
∑
i∈N
xi
n
≥ min{y1,
∑
i∈N
yi
n
}. (3)
By (3), 1m [
∑
i∈N
xi − (n − m) min{y2,
∑
i∈N
yi
n }] ≥ z∗1 ≥ min{y1,
∑
i∈N
yi
n }, and thus z∗2 =
∑
i∈N
xi−mz∗1
n−m ≥
(n−m) min{y2,
∑
i∈N
yi
n }
n−m = min{y2,
∑
i∈N
yi
n }. Moreover, since
∑
i∈N
z∗i =
∑
i∈N
xi ≥ ∑
i∈N
yi, then by Lemma 2,
z∗ % y.
Let z ∈ r(Rn+) be such that z % x and z % y. Since z∗ % y, then to show that z∗ = max% {x, y},
it suffices to check that z % z∗ % x. If 1m [
∑
i∈N
xi − (n − m) min{y2,
∑
i∈N
yi
n }] = min{y1,
∑
i∈N
yi
n }, then
1
m
[
∑
i∈N
xi − (n − m) min{y2,
∑
i∈N
yi
n
}] =
∑
i∈N
xi
n
=
∑
i∈N
yi
n
= min{y1,
∑
i∈N
yi
n
}.
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If y1 = min{y1,
∑
i∈N
yi
n }, then y1 =
∑
i∈N
yi
n . If y1 > min{y1,
∑
i∈N
yi
n }, then y2 <
∑
i∈N
yi
n , and thus
y1 = 1m [
∑
i∈N
xi − (n − m) min{y2,
∑
i∈N
yi
n }] =
∑
i∈N
yi
n . In either case, y =
∑
i∈N
yi
n 1 =
∑
i∈N
xi
n 1 = z
∗.
Since z % y and y = z∗, then z % z∗. Since z∗ =
∑
i∈N
xi
n 1, then z
∗ % x. Suppose from now
on that 1m [
∑
i∈N
xi − (n − m) min{y2,
∑
i∈N
yi
n }] > min{y1,
∑
i∈N
yi
n }. If z∗1 = x1, then z∗ = x, and we
are done. Assume that z∗1 = min{y1,
∑
i∈N
yi
n }. Then by (3),
∑
i∈N
xi
n ≥ min{y1,
∑
i∈N
yi
n } ≥ x1. Thus,
z∗1 ≥ x1 = min{x1,
∑
i∈N
xi
n } and z∗2 =
∑
i∈N
xi−mz∗1
n−m ≥
∑
i∈N
xi−
m
∑
i∈N
xi
n
n−m =
∑
i∈N
xi
n ≥ min{x2,
∑
i∈N
xi
n }. Note that∑
i∈N
z∗i =
∑
i∈N
xi. Hence, by Lemma 2, z∗ % x. Moreover, min{z∗1,
∑
i∈N
z∗i
n } = min{z∗1,
∑
i∈N
xi
n } =
min{y1,
∑
i∈N
yi
n }, and min{z∗2,
∑
i∈N
z∗i
n } = min{
∑
i∈N
xi−mz∗1
n−m ,
∑
i∈N
xi
n } ≤ min{
∑
i∈N
xi−mx1
n−m ,
∑
i∈N
xi
n } = min{x2,
∑
i∈N
xi
n }.
Since z % x and z % y, then by Lemma 2, ∑
i∈N
zi ≥ ∑
i∈N
xi =
∑
i∈N
z∗i , z1 ≥ min{y1,
∑
i∈N
yi
n } =
min{z∗1,
∑
i∈N
z∗i
n }, and z2 ≥ min{x2,
∑
i∈N
xi
n } ≥ min{z∗2,
∑
i∈N
z∗i
n }. By Lemma 2, z % z∗. Lastly, assume
that z∗1 =
1
m [
∑
i∈N
xi− (n−m) min{y2,
∑
i∈N
yi
n }]. By (3), x1 ≥ 1m [
∑
i∈N
xi− (n−m) min{y2,
∑
i∈N
yi
n }] ≥
∑
i∈N
xi
n .
Thus, z∗1 ≥ min{x1,
∑
i∈N
xi
n } and z∗2 =
∑
i∈N
xi−mz∗1
n−m ≥
∑
i∈N
xi−mx1
n−m = x2 ≥ min{x2,
∑
i∈N
xi
n }. By Lemma 2,
z∗ % x. Moreover, min{z∗1,
∑
i∈N
z∗i
n } = min{z∗1,
∑
i∈N
xi
n } =
∑
i∈N
xi
n = min{x1,
∑
i∈N
xi
n }, and min{z∗2,
∑
i∈N
z∗i
n } =
min{
∑
i∈N
xi−mz∗1
n−m ,
∑
i∈N
xi
n } = min{min{y2,
∑
i∈N
yi
n },
∑
i∈N
xi
n } = min{y2,
∑
i∈N
yi
n }. By Lemma 2,
∑
i∈N
zi ≥ ∑
i∈N
xi =∑
i∈N
z∗i , z1 ≥ min{x1,
∑
i∈N
xi
n } = min{z∗1,
∑
i∈N
z∗i
n }, and z2 ≥ min{y2,
∑
i∈N
yi
n } = min{z∗2,
∑
i∈N
z∗i
n }. By Lemma
2, z % z∗.
Let (ϕ, µ) be such that for each (G, v) ∈ P, ϕ selects all efficient path(s) in (G, v), and
µ(G, v) = max
%
{r( ∑
e in L
v(e)) : L in G}.
Proposition 3. The solution (ϕ, µ) is continuously (r, % ) - rationalizable.
Proof. Note that for each pair x ≥ y, r(x) ≥ r(y), and thus r(x) % r(y). Hence, by the
definition of (ϕ, µ) and Proposition 2, (ϕ, µ) is (r, % ) - rationalizable.
To see that the solution is continuously (r, % ) - rationalizable, let g : r(Rn+)2 → r(Rn+),
x, y ∈ r(Rn+) and {xt}∞t=1, {yt}∞t=1 be two sequences of elements of r(Rn+) such that limt→∞ x
t = x
and lim
t→∞ y
t = y. Let z := max{x, y} and for each t ∈ N, zt := max{xt, yt}. Let m := |S 1|. Sup-
pose without loss of generality that
∑
i∈N
xi ≥ ∑
i∈N
yi. If
∑
i∈N
xi >
∑
i∈N
yi, then for sufficiently large
t ∈ N, ∑
i∈N
xti >
∑
i∈N
yti. By the proof of Proposition 2, z1 = med{min{y1,
∑
i∈N
yi
n }, x1, 1m [
∑
i∈N
xi − (n −
m) min{y2,
∑
i∈N
yi
n }]}, z2 =
∑
i∈N
xi−mz1
n−m , and for sufficiently large t, z
t
1 = med{min{yt1,
∑
i∈N
yti
n }, xt1, 1m [
∑
i∈N
xti−
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(n − m) min{yt2,
∑
yti
n }]}, and zt2 =
∑
i∈N
xti−mzt1
n−m . Clearly, limt→∞ z
t = z. If
∑
i∈N
xi =
∑
i∈N
yi, then
z1 = med{min{y1,
∑
i∈N
yi
n }, x1, 1m [
∑
i∈N
xi− (n−m) min{y2,
∑
i∈N
yi
n }]} = med{min{x1,
∑
i∈N
xi
n }, y1, 1m [
∑
i∈N
yi−
(n − m) min{x2,
∑
i∈N
xi
n }]}, and z2 =
∑
i∈N
xi−mz1
n−m =
∑
i∈N
yi−mz1
n−m . For each t, if
∑
i∈N
xti ≥
∑
i∈N
yti, then
zt1 = med{min{yt1,
∑
i∈N
yti
n }, xt1, 1m [
∑
i∈N
xti− (n−m) min{yt2,
∑
i∈N
yti
n }]} and zt2 =
∑
i∈N
xti−mzt1
n−m . If
∑
i∈N
xti <
∑
i∈N
yti,
then zt1 = med{min{xt1,
∑
i∈N
xti
n }, yt1, 1m [
∑
i∈N
yti − (n − m) min{xt2,
∑
i∈N
xti
n }]} and zt2 =
∑
i∈N
yti−mzt1
n−m . It can be
readily seen that lim
t→∞ z
t = z.
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